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Preface
Waste management is a growing challenge in Kenya and other countries in East Africa, as well as
in western, southern and northern Africa. The increase in solid waste generation has not been
accompanied by an equivalent increase in the capacity of relevant urban authorities to deal with it,
nor with a particularly evident expansion of the demand from industrial or agricultural value
chains. In a dry continent where soils are seriously depleted and countries like Kenya are facing
serious fertiliser shortages, the recovery and valorisation of organic waste in agricultural systems
is astonishingly underutilised. Managing organic waste separately is not yet part of the experience
– or of the accepted work package – of most African city councils and waste officials, despite the
fact that increasing the beneficial use of organic waste as animal feed, compost or energy would
contribute to closing the rural–urban nutrient cycles in a sustainable manner.
Understanding the problems and potentials of the organic waste stream is perhaps the single
most important step that city authorities could take in moving towards sustainable, affordable,
effective and efficient waste management. This publication presents four examples of recent
attempts to manage organic waste sustainably in the African context. The participants in the
‘Nairobi organic urban waste’ project have structured this case exercise in order to use the case
studies as object lessons, to harvest genuine insights into the feasibility of a variety of ways to
successfully and sustainably valorise urban organic waste streams.
We present three contemporary case examples of compost production. These include
composting by a community-based organisation in the Kenyan private sector and by a public-
private partnership in Malawi. In all three cases, the project and case study focus is on the
relations between city waste and the agricultural supply chain. A fourth case study describes the
technical and economic potential to produce and use biogas from urban organic waste.
We hope that the information presented here will be useful for your work, whether you are a policy
maker, a practitioner or an entrepreneur. We also hope that it will contribute to the financial and
environmental sustainability of new and existing initiatives to close urban–rural nutrient cycles and
to use organic urban waste for biogas production in Africa.
Prof. Dr R.B.M. Huirne
Managing Director LEI, part of Wageningen UR
From the editors
We present this document as a work in progress, and as an invitation to other initiatives to valorise and
manage organic waste sustainably to and close precious nutrient loops in Africa. The template used to gather
and organise the information and present the cases is open source (see Appendix 1). Please feel free, as a
stakeholder in organic waste, to use this template to profile your own initiatives and submit them to WASTE
(via www.waste.nl) for inclusion in a later edition of this document.
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5Chapter 1
Introduction1
Anne Scheinberg, WASTE
Yuca Waarts, LEI, part of Wageningen UR
Nairobi calls itself 'The Green City in the Sun', and is the political and administrative capital of
the Republic of Kenya. It has a population of 4 million and an area of 696 km2, making it is the
largest metropolitan area in East Africa. The city hosts two UN agencies: the UN Human
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP).
The purpose of this publication is to provide policy makers, practitioners and entrepreneurs with
genuine insights into urban organic waste management that is connected to composting and
biogas production in East Africa. The information on the case studies in this publication is
presented in order to contribute to the development and implementation of the ISWM Plan for
Nairobi, which is currently being developed under the auspices of the City Council of Nairobi
(CCN), UNEP and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency).
This publication contains both qualitative and quantitative information about feasible approaches
to connect urban organic waste streams to the agricultural supply chain. The guiding framework
for the development of the case studies is the Integrated Solid Waste Management framework,
as it was presented in the Habitat book Solid Waste Management in the World's Cities. The case
study template can be found in Appendix 1.
1.1 Challenges of waste management in Nairobi
Solid waste management in Kenya is an issue of primary concern to policy makers and the public
at large. The significance of this issue is underscored by the rapid population increase, which has
resulted in the generation of increased quantities of waste. Thus, the need for an integrated
framework that recognises the key aspects of the waste hierarchy – reduce, reuse, recycle and
recover – has become absolutely imperative to concerned policy makers. Although numerous
institutions play a role in the formulation and implementation of waste management policies and
action plans, the main responsibility for waste management lies with the municipal and county
councils.
The current generation rate of waste in the city of Nairobi alone is 760,000 metric tonnes per
year, or about 3,000 tonnes per working day. The waste consists mostly of wet, partly
decomposed kitchen, garden, and agricultural and commercial biomass, with smaller quantities of
textile, plastic, paper, glass and metal. This represents about 219 kg per person per year, which
is a low figure even for many African cities. Some 60-70% of this waste is collected, mostly by
about 200 private and community-based waste contractors of varying sizes that contract with
individual households and businesses, as well as with housing estates and communities. 60% of
the waste that is collected currently ends up on partially controlled dump sites, as it has for more
than 20 years. The most important disposal site is Dandora in the centre of Nairobi; attempts to
close Dandora and reclaim the land for additional housing have consistently failed due to the lack
of an alternative. A site in Ruai, in south-eastern Nairobi, has been proposed continuously since
the 1990s as a new landfill site. In November 2010, an international tender was issued on
decommissioning the Dandora dump site. Recently, another tender was issued regarding the
opening and development of a dump site in Ruai. Dumping is to start in Ruai after a three-year
decommissioning process at Dandora. At the moment of writing, we have no information about
the responses to these tenders.
Waste that does not get collected or delivered to a dump site is ‘managed’ via open burning or is
discharged into water or littered on streets. Informal burning and decomposition, combined with
animals grazing on informal transfer sites, result in water, soil and air pollution and to presumed
health problems for Nairobi's citizens.
Nairobi has been the site of a series of initiatives to modernise and upgrade its waste system,
starting with the Japan International Cooperation Association (JICA) initiative in the 1990s, and
most recently a UNEP-International Environmental Technology Centre (UNEP-IETC) planning
exercise concurrent with this project. In these 15 years, little has changed on the ground.
The best that can be said about waste management in Nairobi is that although it is a challenge,
the private sector has both opportunities and has had successes that are hardly equalled
elsewhere in Africa. Another positive sign in the face of the enormous challenge of collecting and
managing 3000 tonnes per day of waste without a modern disposal site, is that many sections of
the city are rather clean. The heaps of waste on streets that were common in the 1990s have
disappeared. Also, in many places payment by the bag or by the household works rather well.
In some ways, the fact that Nairobi city itself offers waste management through a rather weak
institutional framework has opened up a set of opportunities for private sector, community-based
organisations (CBOs) and non-state actors to fill the gaps in creative ways. There is a lot of
interesting activity, but the challenge remains enormous and there is still a long way to go.
As the Nairobi organic urban waste project was starting, the City Council of Nairobi and Kenya's
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources commissioned the development of a new
comprehensive Integrated Solid Waste Management (ISWM) Plan for Nairobi. The activities for this
ISWM Plan were launched in March 2009. This plan is designed to help Nairobi to overcome its
solid waste management challenges, with a focus on solving the public health issues related to
the lack of consistent, efficient and effective waste collection and disposal, and to reduce waste
streams by at least 50% through recycling. To achieve these objectives, the ISWM strategy
foresees the development of public-private partnerships for all activities (collection, separation,
recycling and disposal) related to waste management.
1.2 Recycling and organic waste valorisation in Nairobi
Like most cities in low- and middle-income countries, the recovery and recycling of waste in
Nairobi is the work of informal metal, paper and plastic recyclers. There is a partially functioning
informal organic waste valorisation system based on the transport of selected varieties of market
waste and animal manures to subsistence or commercial agriculture around and outside the city.
The percentage of the waste that is recovered is reported to be around 24% of the total
generated, or 210,240 tonnes per year as reported in the profile of Nairobi in UN-Habitat’s 2010
publication, Solid Waste Management in the World’s Cities (Scheinberg, Wilson and Rodic 2010).
This recovery happens entirely through private channels, in private-to-private transactions.
The City Council of Nairobi (CCN) – the main institutional anchor for public cleansing and waste
management in Nairobi – has no comprehensive system for segregation at source, nor are there
any formal transfer stations or other forms of publicly financed infrastructure to divert materials
for valorisation or recycling. In addition to private waste collecting companies, the city has many
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CBOs and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that collect waste and engage in some
recycling and composting on a semi-commercial basis. This was an unregulated activity until
2006, when the city council introduced a registration requirement to regularise these practices
and introduce some level of quality and administrative control.
The reuse and valorisation of organic waste is limited to semi-formal concession-like claims to
waste from markets: the marketeers themselves or others claim and collect the waste and use it
for feeding livestock or as direct nutrients for crops. Composting is a recognised activity in one
market, and has been attempted in several NGO and CBO projects, but to say that compost is
recognised as a commodity or product would be going too far. However, the ‘Nairobi organic
urban waste’ project did uncover a rather lively trade in manure from the Masai area. The manure
is brought to the edge of the city and sold partially composted for fertiliser.
1.3 Organic waste: a sustainable solution for tackling
fertiliser and energy shortages in Nairobi
At a time when Kenya is facing serious fertiliser and energy shortages, organic waste is not being
recovered and recycled. If fertiliser shortages are solved by applying chemical fertilisers, there is
also a danger of eutrophication of all open water in the Great Lakes region. Compost would
contribute to closing the rural-urban nutrient cycles and improve the poor African soil structures
in a very sustainable manner. And biogas generation from organic waste could, if implemented on
a large scale, decrease the dependency on energy from other sources.
The organic fraction of municipal solid waste in Nairobi is estimated to be at least 50% of the
total daily waste generated in the city. A similar ratio is likely to be the case in other large urban
centres in East Africa. Given the large quantities involved, the project was formulated to explore
additional opportunities for segregating and using the organic waste stream as a renewable
resource in the agricultural value chain, namely as animal feed or compost, and for energy
generation.
Because of the waste management challenges and the perceived potential of organic waste
recycling, the project conducted an evaluation of compost and biogas production initiatives.
This evaluation took the form of an investigation into four composting initiatives, each of which
had a distinct organisational form. The data from three of these were good enough to consider
the initiatives case examples. We also conducted one study to evaluate the feasibility of a
relatively new technique for biogas production from organic urban waste.
Only a very few local composting initiatives are operational to date in Nairobi. Most of the
initiatives that started have shut down or are operating based on subsidies or donations, or are
unable to upscale their compost production. Nairobi's organic waste is also sometimes sought
after for animal feed purposes, but this occurs on a very limited scale. Next to composting
initiatives, quite a large number of biogas initiatives have been started in Kenya, but these focus
mostly on biogas generation from manure in peri-urban and rural areas.
1.4 The Nairobi organic urban waste recycling project
and partnership (2009-2010)
In 2009, Wageningen UR received funding from the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Agriculture and Innovation to explore options for the valorisation of organic urban waste in
Nairobi. This action research activity was to be connected to the development of the Integrated
Solid Waste Management (ISWM) Plan for Nairobi. The conclusions and recommendations were to
inform the implementation of organic waste management in major cities in East Africa.
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In order to effectively and efficiently implement this action research project, Wageningen UR
formed a partnership with WASTE advisers on urban environment and development, and with local
partners in Kenya, that is, the ECM Centre, ETC-East Africa and Carbon Africa. Carbon Africa was
included in the partnership at the end of 2009. The reason for this was that the project focus had
shifted. It appeared valuable to look into the production of both compost and biogas from organic
waste, instead of focusing only on compost production.
In 2009, members of the team assessed the generation of organic waste in Nairobi and made an
inventory of the users and producers of and markets for compost, biogas and livestock feed.
We also made a long-list of potential pilot projects to be supported by the project, and evaluated
them as to their usefulness and replicability. Based on these assessments, we designed two pilot
projects to be implemented in 2010.
The first pilot project addressed the institutional barriers to sourcing organic waste from a market
in Nairobi for compost production purposes. The project involved cooperation with a compost
business and CCN and is presented as a case study in Chapter 2. The second pilot assessed the
technical and economic potential of the ARTI biogas system, which is dealt with in Chapter 5.
In order to put the two pilots into perspective, the team went searching for other sub-Saharan
African examples of composting or organic waste valorisation. While there are many anecdotes,
it was surprisingly difficult to find real cases of something that was happening in practice and
could therefore be evaluated. We began with three other compost production initiatives, ranging
from a self-help group (SHG) to a CBO. While the SHG proved to be non-operational at the time,
and is therefore finally not included in this publication, the other two have been profiled as the
remaining two case studies. A brief report on a visit to the SHG initiative in 2009 by project staff
is included as Appendix 2.
For more information on the partners in the partnership, and where to find the outputs of this
project, please see Appendix 3.
1.5 Structure of this publication
The core of this publication consists of the following four case studies:
• The composting company: a case study of ECoH Holdings Ltd., Nairobi, Kenya (Ch. 2)
• Composting by a community-based organisation: a case study of the Women’s Group Lilongwe,
Lilongwe, Malawi (Ch. 3)
• Commercial organic waste recovery by a cooperative society: a case study of NAWAKOM,
Nakuru, Kenya (Ch. 4)
• Biogas from urban organic waste: a case study about the technical and economic potential of
the ARTI technology, Nairobi, Kenya (Ch. 5).
Chapter 6 presents reflections and conclusions based on these four case studies.
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The composting company:
a case study of ECoH Holdings
Ltd., Nairobi, Kenya
Nathalie Agathos, WASTE
2.1 Context
Table 2.1 Basic benchmarks
City Nairobi
Population 4 million
Amount of solid waste generated 3,000 tonnes per day3
Amount of organic waste generated 1,800 tonnes per day (60% of total)
Types of organic waste Green waste, meat, bone and fish remains from market,
hotels, schools, hospitals and other institutions,
kitchen waste, farmyard manure, crop residues and
yard trimmings, slaughterhouse remains
Amount of compost produced by private companies 24-180 tonnes/year4
Amount of compost produced by NGOs 60-120 tonnes/year
Amount of compost produced by CBOs 5-84 tonnes/year
2.2 Introduction
ECoH Holdings Limited is a privately owned, Nairobi-based composting company that was
established in 2007. The company has now been in operation for three years, under the
management of its two directors. It has a workforce of six permanent staff and six casualworkers,
who are actively involved in the composting process. The company is licensed by the National
Environmental Management Organization to handle waste and undertake recycling activities. The
company collects organic wastes from municipal markets and composts it at its site in Athi River,
which is 25 km from Nairobi city centre. One of the competitive advantages of the company is the
fact that it sells compost in the form of pellets, rather than soil. The pellets are branded under the
name ‘YAD Biovitalizer’.
2.3 The stakeholders
A stakeholder is a person or organisation that has an interest in a specific systems5. Based on
this definition, ECoH Holdings has a wide variety of stakeholders, ranging from local communities
to the City Council of Nairobi. The relationship developed with each of the stakeholders takes the
form of a bilateral exchange of resources and benefits. The main stakeholders identified in the
case of ECoH Holdings are presented below.
The initiators–owners
Edwin Kamau and Collin Mwenda, two chemists by profession, decided to venture into
composting organic city waste. Using their expertise in biochemistry, they identified a good
balance of materials that in their view would allow the best quality compost. After four or five
years of research and development, they used their own start-up capital to open a composting
facility. They are the owners, financiers and operators of their facilities.
The company’s start-up capital originated from the personal equity of the two owners and the
company has operated without support from any external financial institution. However, the
company is currently seeking to expand its operations and has approached certain banks in
Kenya and other financial institutions that could be interested in financing them. Some of these
are K-Rep, Family Bank, Equity Bank, Commercial Bank of Kenya, Development Bank of Kenya
and the National Bank of Kenya.
Local communities
ECoH Holding’s operations are highly dependent on cooperation with local municipal councils,
primarily for sourcing the organic waste that is generated at various communal or private
locations. These locations include the Nairobi Kenyatta Airport, local fruit and vegetables markets
(such as Wakulima and Makovo city markets), and fresh produce companies that generate a
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considerable amount of organic waste after processing food-based products. The company has
ensured its access to these sources primarily through the interpersonal relations of the owners
with the individual employees working at those specific locations. Kitchen waste from households
is occasionally also collected.
Local communities not only provide ECoH Holdings with resources but also benefit from the
actual operations of the company within their region. ECoH’s philosophy is to provide both
environmental and social benefits by reducing the amount of organic waste that ends up in local
landfills, providing a sustainable soil-conditioning product that benefits the agricultural soils and
thus ensures that the local fresh produce is of good quality. Also, they aim to provide employment
opportunities for idle neighbour boys, in order to help them rehabilitate and reduce their drug
addiction and crime involvement.
The City Council of Nairobi (CCN)
The fact that the ownership of all urban
waste in Nairobi lies with the CCN makes the
council one of the most important
stakeholders in the company. ECoH Holdings
recently got permission from CCN to access
and recover organic waste from Wakulima
city market, as a first step towards a public–
private partnership between the company
and the CCN. Once again, the various
shareholders will enjoy mutual benefits:
ECoH will gain access to a source of large
volumes of organic waste and CCN will
minimise the amount of waste to be
collected and sent to the landfill.
The farmers
The local agricultural sector maintains a high level of interest in the company’s operations since it
is the farmers who buy and utilise the compost pellets. The composition and nutrient balance of
the pellets is to correspond to the needs of the local soils, thus ensuring the operational
sustainability of ECoH. The company’s has around 200 customers. ECoH Holdings is currently
distributing its products through two farmers’ associations, namely the Kilgoris farmers’
association and the Bomet farmers’ association.
The company’s stakeholder base is now international, as it also receives orders from farmers
in Uganda.
2.4 The system elements
ECoH Holdings business model includes the following elements of a typical waste management
system: generation/sources, collection/transport and treatment.
Generation/sources
The main input sources are the city airport, the city markets and processors of fresh produce.
ECoH Holdings sources organic waste from twenty collection locations spread around Nairobi. It
is most probable, however, that there are more than twenty actual sources, since it is very likely
that one collection location represents more than one supplier of organic waste. In any case, 95%
of all organic waste accumulated for ECoH Holding’s use comes from sources and stakeholders
within the Nairobi area.
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The diversity of the sources means that ECoH receives many types of organic waste, including
green waste, fruits and vegetables, animal manures, and other wastes. This gives them a
balanced carbon-nitrogen (C-N) ratio, which is what is needed in order to produce compost with
the desirable nitrogen-phosphorus-potassium (NPK) values. An important element in the
interaction with the suppliers (apart from the diversity of waste) is the fact that the suppliers are
paid for the organic waste they supply. By paying for the organic waste, ECoH Holdings creates
a financial incentive to the generators, which contributes to the stability of the flow of input
materials it needs to make its pelletised compost product.
Collection/transport
The collection/transport model used by ECoH is based on renting a truck and collecting the
materials at each of the individual points of generation or storage. The truck is rented at ECoH’s
expense. The collection system is based on orders: ECoH requests specific volumes from a
supplier and then hires a truck. Once the order is ready, the truck picks it up. The average
distance from the supplying sources is 10-30 km. Once collected, the organic waste fractions are
transported to the open-air facility for composting. The open site is located approximately 28 km
from the processing facility.
Specifications and conditions of purchase
The conditions of purchase for the suppliers are basically to deliver the agreed volumes and to
store or shelter the food or green waste at an agreed-upon location that is known to ECoH and to
which it has access. Such storage must be protected from the wind and excess water until the
moment of collection. There are rare occasions on which the suppliers deliver the organic waste
materials themselves.
Treatment
The treatment or processing process is currently performed at two locations. An open-air location
hosts the biological processes of composting and all the manual processes, including pile
formation, watering, and turning. The composting technique used is windrow composting and
it is done in batches. Certain types of bacterial inoculant are added to facilitate the process.
The staff state that the types of bacteria used are selected based on phytosanitary mechanisms
and observed nutrient balances. More specific information is not available because this company
operates on a commercial basis and considers this information proprietary.
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The curing (maturing after the period of active composting is complete), blending or mixing of
different types of organic waste, and pelletising of the final compost takes place in a 150m2
enclosed industrial building, or warehouse, which is equipped with processing machines for
transforming the compost into pellets. The correct mixture is based on the different NPK values
of the materials. The final product has an NPK value of 2-2-3 and is primarily intended to meet
farmers’ requirements. Once pelletised, the product – YAD Biovitalizer – is packaged in 50 kg
bags and stored until sent to the client.
The complete cycle takes approximately three months, depending on the materials processed.
The company adjusts its processing to accommodate a variety of input conditions: different
moisture content or a different combination of carbon and nitrogen. The planning of the process
is done four months in advance in order to ensure that the production phase coincides with the
dry and wet season in Kenya. Composting at ECoH Holdings occurs during the dry season, which
means that between March and September the company pauses the biological composting
process and limits its operations to the mechanical treatment necessary to produce the pellets.
ECoH Holdings provides quality control by having every batch of compost and its leachate tested.
The tests are carried out at KARI (Kenya Agricultural Research Institute).
2.5 The sustainability aspects
Technical
The technical characteristics of ECoH’s operations refer to the indicators that represent the
technical performance of the company.
Product types: The company’s compost is packed in 50 kg sacks; branded YAD® (a registered
trademark, with the Kenya Industrial Property Institute). The leachate harvested from the
composting process is also packaged and branded as ECoH Balance.
Production volumes: 3-4 tonnes per day of compost pellets.
Product buffer: 500 bags of YAD on a constant basis.
Maximum machine output: 300 kg/hour
Processing time: On average, less than 7 days/month; the main reason is the pelletising
machine breaking down because of overuse.
The main technical challenge for ECoH is
related to the inbuilt capacity of the
pelletising unit, which is quite limited.
However, it would be quite costly to replace
the machine, and the company cannot afford
to do so with their own financial means
Financial
The financial aspects refer to the financial
performance of ECoH Holdings as a limited
liability company. The company was founded
with the owners’ private equity. The company
has reached its break-even point (after three
years of operation), but has not yet realised
any profits. All revenues are used to cover
daily operations and research & development
activities.
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Annual turnover: approximately 1,000,000 Ksh
Product price: 2,000 Ksh/bag of compost
External sources of finance: none so far.
The main challenge the company faces with regards to the financial aspects of its operation is
accessing loans. As mentioned, the company has not received any type of external financing,
such as loans or grants, although they have applied for a loan to buy a new pelletiser. The
underlying reason for this is the aversion of financial institutions to support companies operating
in a sector of which they have no knowledge. Local financial institutions and in particular local
banks are often not in a position to understand and evaluate the true risks of the compost
product. According to ECoH, they consequently regard YAD as a highly risky investment, unlike
the well-established chemical fertiliser industry, which has a proven track record of profitability.
Another reason for the restricted access to finance is the false perception that ECoH Holdings is
not significantly different from CBOs, which are often seen as unlikely to reach a profitability point
and often have no significant legal standing. Local financial institutions are not yet convinced
about the particular business model of ECoH holdings.
Sociocultural
Farmers’ have mixed attitudes towards using compost. But those farmers who do use YAD are
quite positive and there is a common understanding of its positive impacts on their soils. One of
the challenges for ECoH is that farmers have not yet realised the potential of the product.
Farmers also believe that they lack the technical guidance on how to use the YAD compost in
their fields, or what quantities to use. They currently apply two bags of YAD per acre. ECoH is
therefore investigating what application rates should be used in various circumstances (soil types,
climate). The owners of ECoH believe that barriers related to farmers’ perceptions could be dealt
with easily: one only needs to present them with tangible results and they will not hesitate to go
for compost.
An important sociocultural aspect that could be investigated with regard to the use of compost
for agricultural use is the potential effects not only on the crops themselves but also on the wider
environment (e.g. soil quality and biodiversity) and the agricultural value chain. Were all the costs
and benefits of compost made clear to the farmers, in comparison with the costs and benefits of
chemical fertilisers, farmers would be able to make a better decision about which type of
fertiliser to apply.
Institutional
The involvement of public institutions in the operations of ECoH Holdings is currently restricted to
the licensing stage. The City Council of Nairobi has recently issued a license for the company to
collect organic waste from Wakulima city market. As mentioned, the ownership of the organic
waste fractions produced within Nairobi lies with the municipal council. Therefore, the institutional
barriers faced by the company every time it wants to access more fractions of organic waste are
quite high. The lack of a focal strategic plan for solid waste management in Nairobi is making it
harder to interact with the town council. Even though the CCN is currently planning its solid waste
management activities, it is unclear whether a centralised, privatised or a community-based
approach will be adopted for organic waste.
The company is considering partnering with municipalities if that would allow it to expand its
operations and construct a solid base of sources and customers.
In terms of academic institutions, ECoH Holdings receives support from the Kenyan Agricultural
Research Institute (KARI). The institute has recently completed, on behalf of ECoH Holdings,
research evaluating the effects of YAD Biovitalizer on crop growth, productivity and microbial
populations in the greenhouse. The owners of the company invested around four years of work in
14
personal research and experimenting in order to create a product that is appropriate for Kenyan
soils. However, the lack of adequate scientific and academic research on composting and soil
biodiversity is an additional challenge to the company in its effort to expand and promote YAD.
Scientific communities in the country do not seem to truly understand compost and tend to
evaluate it as chemical fertiliser. ECoH stated that academics are confused by the fact that a
chemical fertiliser might have a higher NPK value than compost. This apparently results in
academics failing to value the use of compost. However, the owners are trying to promote
research on the topic and prove that compost is a sustainable product.
Environmental
There are two main types of environmental aspects related to the activities and operations of
ECoH Holdings, namely the positive and the negative externalities. The positive externalities are
linked to the environmental benefits of diverting organic waste fractions from the landfill, which
implies less volume to be burned at the site and consequently less air and ground water pollution.
The negative externalities are linked to the actual environmental pollution the company creates by
operating its facilities. The owners are considering conducting an environmental impact
assessment to calculate the net environmental benefits of their operations.
ECoH Holdings is licensed by the National Environmental Management Association (NEMA), the main
environmental regulatory institution in Kenya, to handle waste and undertake recycling activities.
Governance, policy and legal
ECoH Holdings is registered under the Private Companies Act as a limited liability company. It has
fully legal operational permission and pays the appropriate corporate/income tax as required by
the national laws of Kenya. The main policy challenges ECoH is facing are related to the current
limitations laid down in the solid waste management by-laws, which prevent the large-scale
diversion of waste from the source, to either recycling or reuse, without the explicit permission of
the City Council of Nairobi. This has prevented the adequate recovery of organic wastes from the
municipal markets.
The City Council of Nairobi has two operational structures: the decision-making (political or policy)
structure, which is run on a committee-based system and is headed by the mayor, and the
administrative or management structure, which is run on a department-based system and is
headed by the city clerk. The management team consolidates departmental recommendations to
be presented to the relevant sectoral committees for consideration. The CCN had monopolistic
control over sanitation and waste management prior to the Environmental Management and
Coordination Act (1999). Other agencies require authority from the CCN to handle waste
materials and/or provide waste management services. The CCN provides solid-waste collection
services under the Local Government Act (CAP 265) and Public Health Act (CAP242)6. The former
empowers the CCN to establish and maintain solid-waste collection services, while the latter
requires the CCN to provide services. Using the Local Government Act, the CCN has enacted by-
laws on waste management, although implementation has been weak. The by-laws:
1. Prohibit the illegal deposition of waste;
2. Specify storage and collection responsibilities for waste generators;
3. Reserve the right of the CCN to collect revenues from ’solid waste collection’.
The CCN influences and regulates composting and waste management in Nairobi in a number of
ways, including:
1. Refuse/waste management practices that make available waste inputs for composting
(collection, transport and disposal);
2. Land use delineation and zoning (development control);
3. Licensing and revenue collection.
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To collect, transport and dispose waste from any waste generator, the CCN requires that entities
be registered with the CCN.
ECoH Holdings has engaged itself in a pilot public–private partnership in an effort to establish the
adequate linkages and relations with the municipal council of Nairobi. The steps followed in order
to obtain permission to collect waste from the Wakulima market took a long time, and 2011 will
show whether this public-private partnership is effective. One of the remaining challenges is to
find a location near the Wakulima market where the composting can take place.
2.6 Advantages and disadvantages
Table 2.2 Advantages and disadvantages
Advantages Disadvantages
Regarding competition: not easily replicable High capital and operational costs
business model due to the relatively high investment
and technical expertise required.
Can be profitable if planned correctly Highly dependent on public institutions
Business expansion to other countries is possible Difficulty in assessing waste sources
The physical characteristics of the product (pellets) Lack of academic research in the field can slow down
make it more convincing than normal compost operations
2.7 Conclusion
The modest success of ECoH Holdings as a private company is based on the company having a
good product and marketing it professionally. This is a demand-driven business model, with a
product that is identifiable. The form is essentially a private-to-private model, based on pure
commodity value. Technical, performance, sociocultural, environmental and health aspects are in
order. The institutional situation with the current relationship with waste generators and sources
appears to be working, but may require some additional work to cover an expansion to a
profitable economy of scale.
Challenges lie in the financial-economic and governance and policy areas. In financial terms,
break-even in three years is a significant success. However, the fact that profits are elusive
suggests that there is an economy of scale problem. The company’s challenges to secure
external financial means, mirrors the experience of valorisation entrepreneurs in other countries:
neither the activity nor the product is seen as ‘bankable.’ Further success could be facilitated by
working with the banking sector, and this might be a reason for the company to look for a project
relationship with a facilitating organisation.
In terms of governance and its relationship with the local authorities, the company needs to work
hard to create and maintain a relationship that will allow it to expand by increasing its access to
sources and its ability to get permits. The fact that this remains a challenge suggests that the
City Council of Nairobi is not sufficiently focused on the environmental benefits (positive
externalities) that the company’s operations create for the city and its citizens. This could be an
indication that more PR or public education would be a useful addition to the directly focused
marketing strategy.
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Chapter 3
Composting by a community-based
organisation: a case study of the
Women’s Group Lilongwe, Lilongwe,
Malawi
Nathalie Agathos, WASTE
Contributions and participation from Tabbie Mnolo, CCODE, Lilongwe, Malawi
3.1 Context
Table 3.1 Basic benchmarks
City Lilongwe, Malawi
Area Mtandire and Chinsapo
Population ≈ 36, 786 and 60,017, respectively7
Amount of solid waste generated 104 tonnes per day8
Amount of organic waste generated 62.4 tonnes per day (60% of total)9
Types of organic waste Sugar-cane, mangoes and nsima from hospitals and
colleges, kitchen waste, animal manures
Amount of compost produced by private companies 0
Amount of compost produced by NGOs n/a
Amount of compost produced by CBOs and SHG ≈ 200 tonnes per year
Established municipal waste collection system Existing but ineffective, under equipped, poorly maintained,
inadequately funded and poorly staffed
3.2 Introduction
The conception and creation of a CBO to treat communal organic waste and process it into
compost for the Mtandire area evolved within a two-level public-private partnership (PPP) between
Lilongwe City Council and several community groups and private entrepreneurs. The purpose of
the PPP was to enable the city council to deliver a waste management service in the low-income
community of Mtandire. The city council partners with private entrepreneurs or women's groups
for the collection, sorting and transport of solid waste, and with Four Seasons Nursery (a large
private horticultural company) to buy and use composted organic manure. Two local NGOs –
Center for Community Organization and Development (CCODE) and Society for Women against
Aids in Malawi (SWAM) – were responsible for mobilising the community and building the capacity
of both sides of the partnership. Those were the enabling conditions for the Women's Composting
CBO to be created.
The group originally started with three women, all of whom were members of Malawi's Homeless
Federation. The group shrank over time because of a lack of significant support and knowledge
about the technical aspects of composting, resulting in there being only one woman in the
organisation. There were many challenges but once the venture proved feasible and was in
operation, the other women rejoined the group. The CBO now consists of 37 women, who work
together to operate open air composting on a common plot. The operation produces about
500 kg per day, enough to offer significant income for all its working members. The main
business model is quite simple: women collect organic waste from their community and other
neighbouring communities, and bring it to a common site. Then they process it in an open air
facility. The women combine the material that they have collected in larger piles. The finished
compost is sold to Four Seasons Nursery.
3.3 The stakeholders
A stakeholder is a person or organisation
that has an interest in a specific system10.
Based on this definition, the groups that have
a stake or interest in the Women's
Composting CBO in Lilongwe include the
community itself (households, community
leaders, farmers), the city council, the
Ministry of Local Government and the Four
Seasons Nursery. The main stakeholders
identified are presented below.
The initiators-owners
As mentioned in the introduction, the initiator of the idea was a group of women from Mtandire,
guided by the Center for Community Organization and Development (CCODE) and the city council.
The women saw the underlying financial and environmental benefits of composting the organic
waste produced nearby. As a result of their uncertainty while waiting for the compost to mature,
the majority of the original initiators abandoned the effort, since there was no significant benefit
for themselves at that particular moment. However, the current chairwoman of the CBO believed
in the process and managed to turn a dubious initiative into a profitable CBO. She also combined
some other types of solid waste recovery (i.e. metals and plastics) in order to support the venture
financially.
The current structure of the CBO is based on four groups, each of which is responsible for the
collection of organic waste from a specific area or zone. Each group consists of four or more
women.
Local communities
The Women's Composting CBO is related to and highly dependent on the surrounding local
communities, whose role is to supply the organic waste produced within their area to the CBO.
The group primarily collects community organic waste. It has developed collaboration networks
with local city markets in order to access some fractions of the organic waste generated at these
locations.
The city council
The primary role of the city council with regards to solid waste management is to formulate and
implement solid waste policies and to provide services for the collection, transport, treatment
and disposal of solid waste with the city of Lilongwe. The city council is also responsible for
monitoring private companies that are engaged in solid waste activities.
The decision of the city council to develop a PPP model for the area of Mtandire was the
cornerstone of the creation of the Women's Composting CBO. Consequently, even though on a
day-to-day basis the city council is not monitoring or interacting with the CBO, it benefits from its
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operations by having a cleaner living environment. Due to the lack of financial and technical
resources, the council has a large stake in maintaining and supporting the group. The council is
also highly interested in registering the Women's CBO, in order for it to have a legal standing and
be able to access more sources of organic waste.
The Ministry of Local Government
The operations of the composting CBO are also related, in theory at least, to the activities of the
Ministry of Local Government, since it is the designated institution for granting permits and
licenses to solid waste operators, as well as for monitoring their activities. However, the CBO is
not yet registered.
The Four Seasons Nursery
This large private horticultural company has a
considerable stake and interest in the CBO's
operations, since it is the only client. The
nursery has agreed to buy the majority of
compost produced by the women, provided it
meets some specific specifications.
3.4 The system elements
The Women's Composting CBO has a business model that includes the following elements of a
typical waste management system: generation, collection/transport and treatment.
Generation and sourcing
The main supplying sources of organic waste for the CBO include city fruits and vegetables
markets and households. In the case of the Women's CBO, the supply locations are spread
around the community and the flow of materials is not consistent in time, volume or quality.
Nevertheless, all organic waste accumulated for the organisation’s use comes from the
community.
To respond to the challenge of an inconsistent supply, the women have started investigating
collection from areas that are more distant than their usual collection locations. The women are
currently facing an additional challenge with regards to the scarcity of organic waste in the area.
Since they have proven that the composting of organic waste is a profitable operation, the
number of women interested in participating is increasing, resulting in higher collection rates and
less organic waste in the streets.
Collection/transport
The collection approach used by the Women's Composting CBO is basic: the women themselves
collect directly from markets or other sources. They are divided into four groups, each of which is
responsible for collection in one area or zone, in order to avoid overlaps. They collect on average
2 tonnes of organic material each day, and they use push carts for the transport process. They
cover on average 5-7 km per day. However, due to the scarcity of materials, the women collect it
from as far away as 10 km.
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Treatment
Once the organic waste has been collected by the four groups, they transport it to the main
processing facility, where the composting process takes place. The facility consists of an open-air
site covering approximately two acres. The process is open-air, static-pile composting. It involves
basic biological and manual activities like piling, mixing, turning and maturing. The overall
composting process takes one month. The equipment used during the individual stages of the
process is quite basic, and includes shovels, gloves, plastic nylon covers for the piles and a few
small carts.
Part of the treatment operations includes mixing, during which the group adds maize husk (the
outer part of maize) or cow dung, in order to enrich the mixture and produce a compost that has
more nutrients. The technical characteristics of the compost are currently being researched by
the University of Malawi.
The final product is packaged in wooden boxes provided by the Four Seasons Nursery, which also
collects the product from the women free of charge.
3.5 The sustainability aspects
Technical
The technical characteristics of the Women's Composting CBO operations refer more to the
indicators that represent the technical performance of the group. These indicators are:
• Product types: the only product is compost;
• Production volumes: 0.5 tonnes per day of compost (≈14 tonnes per month);
• Production time: 1 month.
The main technical challenge the CBO is
facing is related to the facility currently used
for composting. The facility is an open-air
field with no protection from varying weather
conditions. The CBO with the support of
CCODE is currently planning to build a
shaded facility, which will also be equipped
with windrows, in order to protect the
composting process.
Financial
The financial aspects refer to the financial performance of the Women's Composting group as a
CBO. The start-up capital needed was not very high as it had to cover only basic equipment for
mixing, turning and covering the compost piles. During the start-up phase, the Women’s CBO was
supported by CCODE, which provided a loan to the group from its own revolving fund (which is
locally called the Mchengapi Fund). The women were able to repay the loan within two years of
starting production.
Annual turnover: 40,000 Malawi kwachas
Product price: 100-160 Malawi kwachas
External source of finance: loan from a revolving fund
Salary per member: 2,000-3,000 Malawi kwachas per month
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Sociocultural
The activity of these women has increased both environmental and social awareness. Women in
Malawi are usually marginalised compared to men. Women have less access to education, credit,
land and property, but have less access to employment opportunities in the public and private
sectors, technology and other key market information to support their business activities. Due to
their lack of experience, very few employers are willing to recruit and train them on the job. Thus,
the Women's Composting CBO has demonstrated the ability of women to be involved in income-
generating activities that benefit not only themselves but also the community as a whole.
The relation developed with local communities is bilateral since the communities benefit from
the activities of the Women's CBO. Composting the communal organic waste is a sound
environmental management activity that results in larger amounts being diverted from dumps or
local landfills. The operations of those women also provide an indirect way of raising awareness
of environmental issues within the community. The community has seen the positive effect of the
women's activities and the level of involvement is constantly increasing. A type of waste that
used to be dumped or burned, is now being recovered and considered a resource within the
community. Furthermore, the CBO is offering employment opportunities for the women,
who make their own living and are demonstrating women's ability to become entrepreneurs.
There is also a small, though not negligible number of farmers who occasionally require quantities
of compost to apply to their crops.
The model appears to be replicable as long as the demand holds. A specific challenge is the fact
that more and more women would like to get involved in the CBO. However, this is neither
possible nor desired by the women in the group, since they would have to collect waste from
even more distant locations.
Institutional
The CBO receives significant support from both the city council and the country’s academic
institutions. The group’s activities are perceived as positive for the overall community and every
possible access to support is provided. The city council is making efforts to register the CBO.
It also created the enabling environment for the cooperation with the Four Seasons Nursery, in
order for the CBO to have at least one client to buy the compost. Academic institutions, such as
the University of Malawi, are conducting waste management baseline and market research in
order to identify the framework in which the CBO is and should be operating.
Environmental
The environmental benefits of the women's activities are viewed as positive for the community.
The activities contribute to a healthier living environment by dealing with the organic wastes and
by liberating community members from burning or burying their waste. The net environmental
impact of the CBO's operations is positive due to the small-scale of operations and the absence
of electrical equipment from the production process.
Governance, policy and legal
Land is a basic factor of production as well as an important source of livelihood for most
Malawians. There are three legally recognised types of land tenure in Malawi: customary, private
and public. Customary tenure is the most widespread category. However, other sub-tenures that
are commonly practised by customary landholders (e.g. renting and borrowing) are not legally
recognised. Registered private land (freehold and leasehold) accounts for less than 8% of the
total land area. Inadequate access to land is one of the critical factors contributing to poverty in
the country. Additionally, discrimination in access to land based on social status, economic status
and gender is a major constraint.
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The CBO has resolved this challenge with the support of CCODE. The land used for hosting the
CBO belongs to CCODE, and the women have the right to use it without any charge, as part of
the cooperation of CCODE with Malawi's Homeless Federation.
3.6 Advantages and disadvantages
The following table provides more information about the advantages and disadvantages of the
approach adopted by the Women’s Group Lilongwe CBO.
Table 3.2 Advantages and disadvantages
Advantages Disadvantages
No significant operational costs Lack of stability/continuity of the workforce
Easy start-up phase Not profitable without a public–private partnership or
external support
No need to pay taxes Impossible to access finance from financial institutions.
The benefits stay within the community. Bound to fail without technical support
Easily replicable business model that might create
unfavourable competition.
3.7 Conclusion
This initiative can be seen as quite a significant success, especially since there is more demand
both for the product and for the participation than is currently possible. The essence of the
success is that the operations are demand-driven, and in that sense the involvement of Four
Seasons Nursery drives the success. It is this demand – in the context of Malawi’s more general
scarcity of phosphorus and commercial fertiliser – that promises the most success in the future.
The economic and financial aspect is healthy.
The governance aspect is also functioning: the project has the most positive relationship with the
local authority (Ligongewe City Council) of all of the case examples. Still, it is quite clear that this
is a relationship at a distance, mediated by the NGO CCODE, which facilitated the formation of the
women’s groups and organised the composting site. The attitude and behaviour of the LCC
represents a positively inclined version of ‘getting out of the way’ and supporting the project
passively, based on understanding to some extent that it generates positive environmental and
social externalities.
This example is institutionally interesting because it combines the collectively mediated approach
of an NGO with the private-to-private business model of ECoH Holdings. But although ECoH has
the model of a single company collecting from multiple sources, going to a single company’s
operation, it depends on conventional marketing to multiple buyers. The Lilongwe Women’s
Composting project reverses this, with a single buyer (Four Seasons) that purchases compost
from a lightly collectivised processing system. The beneficiaries are single women, who work in
small groups but remain separate income earners. The case suggests that this organisational
form is somehow more stable, but of course the whole enterprise stands or falls on the
continuing interest of Four Seasons. For additional robustness, an alternative buyer would be
advisable.
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Chapter 4
Commercial organic waste recovery
by a cooperative society: a case
study of NAWAKOM, Nakuru, Kenya
Joyce Wanjiru Gachugi, Environmental Cost Management Centre (ECMC)
Paul Kirai, Environmental Cost Management Centre (ECMC)
4.1 Context
Nakuru is Kenya's fourth largest town. It is situated 160 km north-west of Nairobi at an altitude
of 1859 m above sea level. In the Maasai dialect, Nakuru means 'the place of dust': in the dry
season, the town is engulfed in volcanic soil brought to it by whirlwinds. Centred in a rich
agricultural hinterland between the Menengai Crater and Lake Nakuru (home to the famous
pink flamingos), Nakuru was once dubbed 'the cleanest town in East Africa'11 .
Solid waste management is increasingly becoming a focal point among policy makers and
development practitioners in north-west Kenya, due to ever increasing volumes of waste.
Rapid urban growth, estimated at 3.4% per annum12, and increased industrial activity are the
main contributors to this policy crisis. Incomplete waste collection systems and inadequate,
uncontrolled waste disposal lead to accumulating heaps of waste in the town. These are a
daily reminder of the need to implement an effective waste management in the area.
4.2 Introduction
In 2002, a group of CBOs faced with waste management problems in Nakuru town took up the
challenge to do something positive. Practical Action Kenya joined them in the initiative to found
NAWACOM, a cooperative association of Nakuru Waste Collectors and Recyclers Management,
a local CBO operating in the industrial area of Nakuru town. NAWACOM currently has 336
members (165 women and 171 men).
While the initiative and technical support come from Practical Action Kenya, financial support for
the start-up came from the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ, name recently changed to GIZ)
from their Kenya project on solid waste management. Additional funding came from the UK
charity Comic Relief. Since the exit of Comic Relief as a donor partner in 2008, NAWACOM has
been raising funds domestically from the following channels:
1. Membership subscription, which is currently 5,000 Ksh per member per annum;
2. Sale of their compost at 1,500 Ksh per bag;
3. Access to micro-credit facilities – the cooperative has been a beneficiary of a micro credit
loan facility13 from Family Bank, which was used as working capital to pay the waste
collectors who deliver waste to the warehouse before the production season commences.
NAWACOM has 15 members of staff running the day-to-day operations. The roles of the staff are
as follows:
1. Nine of the staff are in the management department, which oversees the coordination of
operations at the cooperative;
2. Three of the staff are permanent labourers;
3. Three are casual workers.
4.3 The system elements
The cooperative operates by contractual agreements with private waste collectors, who collect
organic waste from residences in Nakuru town. The pre-existing claims to organic waste in Nakuru
town lie largely with the farmers, for either individual composting on their own farms or as animal
feed for pigs. The unprocessed food waste is less expensive and more readily available than
compost, and thus reduces the potential market for compost. This is typical of the composting
market in both East and West Africa. In fact, NAWACOM has tried to incorporate the farmers, who
would use the organic waste to produce compost, into their business model, in order to reduce
the competition for the organic waste.
Figure 4.1 Process flow for NAWACOM organic waste recovery
Sourcing and collection
The cooperative hires lorries for 3,500 Ksh per day to collect waste from households.
Households do not pay for this service, nor do they receive payments for their supply of waste to
the cooperative. The waste is then transported to the municipal dump site, where it is sorted and
composted for a period of six weeks. The semi-processed compost is then delivered to the
processing site in the industrial area of Nakuru town.
When the semi-processed waste arrives at NAWACOM’s warehouse in the business district, it is
weighed and collected in a larger area for further decomposition (and curing). After two months,
the compost is sampled and taken for analysis at an approved laboratory, after which it is
blended and enriched with nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium before being packaged.
The estimated output per week is about 2.5 tonnes, as shown in Figure 4.1.
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Equipment and infrastructure
The equipment on site includes:
1. Shifter (conveyor oscillator) – The shifter was locally fabricated. It is equipped with a sieve to
separate the fine component from the larger ones through its vibratory motion. The finer
components are collected at the bottom in sacks, while the larger ones remain on top of the
sieve and are reprocessed;
2. Miscellaneous tools: shovels, goggles, gloves, overalls.
Processing
The plant, though not fully operational at the
time of the study due to the low season
demand for compost, had accumulated
2000 bags of compost, awaiting the
February to April planting season. Some of
the challenges faced by the cooperative are:
1. There is an attitude problem among
farmers, emanating from the fact that
they view organic fertilisers as secondary inputs;
2. The cooperative mentions a lack of government support in terms of knowledge dissemination,
promotion and tax relief in order to reduce the cost of the compost. However it is not clear
whether the local authorities understand what their interest would be in financially supporting
NAWACOM;
3. They are working on the more systematic marketing of the product. They currently rely on
word of mouth;
4. The compost produced by the cooperative is in powder form, while most farmers prefer the
pelletised form.
Marketing
The compost is sold to farmers under the brand name Mazingira. The buyers are in the larger
Nakuru area, as well regions that are further out (such as Kitale, Eldoret, Kisii, Webuye and
Nanyuki, which are agricultural areas).
The cooperative tries to adhere to strict production standards to prevent contamination of the
compost, and thus take samples from every batch produced and have them tested by approved
government laboratories and universities,
such as Egerton University – Njoro Campus.
Mazingira compost is enriched with NPK,
in order to achieve the ratio of 2-1.5-1.8.
The materials used to enrich the compost
are natural14. The compost is packaged in
10 kg, 25 kg and 50 kg synthetic sacks,
similar to those used to package chemical
fertilisers. The markets have responded well,
as the cooperative is distributing its product
through agricultural input stores in Nakuru.
This strategy, though not well entrenched
and limited to only two stores, has increased
the visibility of Mazingira. The cooperative
operates on an order by order basis.
It currently produces about 50-60 bags of
compost per day, which is equivalent to
2,500-3,000 kg per day.
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4.4 The sustainability aspects
Financial
The company has been operating profitably since the exit of Comic Relief’s funding in 2008,
as a result of internal revenue from membership subscription and sales of its compost.
The management, though declining to reveal their financial statements, indicated that their profit
margin is usually 20-30% of their operating costs, with estimated revenues in 2009 from the sale
of compost as shown in Table 1 below.
Table 4.1: Revenue base from compost sales in 2009
Quantity of compost Price (Ksh) per bag Sales in 2009 Total sales (Ksh)
Mazingira 10 kg 300 200 60,000
Mazingira 20 kg 750 440 330,000
Mazingira 50 kg 1,500 1,360 2,040,000
The current marketing strategy is word of mouth from farmer to farmer. While this is an
inexpensive and friendly strategy, it is limiting in scope and volume. As in the Kenyan context
word of mouth may be concentrated within tribal communities, the company might be missing
opportunities. Until now, this strategy has prevented the cooperative from maintaining consistent
sales volumes, as well as most likely limiting its client base.
NAWACOM, however, allows brokers and agents to sell its product on a commission basis,
agreed upon between the cooperative’s management and each individual broker. The distribution
channels and their estimated percentage consumption shares are estimated to be direct selling
(95%), wholesalers and brokers (5%).
Sociocultural
The cooperative has had several kinds of social impacts and has generally positively affected the
lives of several people in Nakuru town in various ways. With respect to livelihoods, the individuals
who deliver the semi-processed compost
have benefited by way of generating income
to cater for their livelihoods. Some of the
waste processors, who were informal waste
pickers, are now formalised and working as
full-time employees of waste collection
companies.
Organic waste generators in the area are
now able to earn some income if they can
compost their organic waste and deliver the
semi-processed compost to the NAWACOM
processing site.
Governance, policy and legal
Compost is largely unregulated in Kenya, as there is no existing legal framework; however, a draft
policy on the use of organic inputs in agriculture in Kenya is to be tabled in parliament by the
Ministry of Agriculture. Despite numerous research efforts undertaken by both private and public
stakeholders, a way forward is still lacking.
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Further, there are no set standards and/or guidelines on compost production in Kenya. Fertilisers
are regulated under the Fertilizers and Animal Foodstuffs Act; however, compost is not regulated
under this act. Although the act defines fertiliser as any substance or mixture of substances that
is intended to or offered in order to improve or maintain the growth of plants or the productivity of
the soil, it does not include manure, compost, wood ash, gypsum or refuse when sold in its
original condition and under the same name, nor does it include organic fertilisers, other than
lime. In 2008, the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) and the Kenya Agricultural Research
Institute (KARI) formed a technical team to formulate guidelines for composting in the country.
However, the team has not yet developed anything tangible.
The required permits for all composting activities in Kenya are:
1. Waste management permit from Nakuru Municipal Council: costs 17,000 Ksh per year;
2. Waste recycler’s permit from NEMA: costs 40,000 Ksh per year.
4.5 Advantages and disadvantages
The NAWACOM case is unique in that it is a cooperative that has brought together various players
in the organic waste recovery arena in Nakuru. This has improved the livelihoods of its members
and provided a diversion for organic waste. While cooperatives are often the organisational form
chosen by CBOs or micro and small enterprise (MSE) waste organisations in West Africa, they are
much less common in East Africa. This case demonstrates that a cooperative can achieve
success in terms of meeting the needs of a community and improving the quality of the
environment.
The current management at NAWACOM believes that the success factor for the cooperative has
been the commitment of its members to ensuring that the cooperative continues to produce
hygienically produced compost. However, it feels that the cooperative has failed to adequately
market its compost, and consequently sales are poor.
The replicability of this case lies in the context of the cooperative model. Despite NAWACOM
appearing not to be able to generate sufficient sales due to its weak marketing strategy, its
structure allows for all members to be equal beneficiaries, with sufficient transparency in its
management structure to curb mismanagement.
4.6 Conclusion
NAWACOM is a partially successful initiative that came about via a project and with strong
support of the international NGO Practical Action. The members of the cooperative are also likely
to be partially dependent on donor funds, as many of them are NGOs or CBOs. While the
cooperative’s success in replacing the financial support of Comic Relief is reassuring, its longer
term survival will depend on it sharpening its business model and business practices, and on
building markets.
The case suggests that there is some institutional strength, and considerable positive
environmental benefits, but that there are weaknesses in the financial, organisational,
performance, technical and governance aspects. More specifically, there is a kind of expectation
that there should be support from the municipal authorities, but the likelihood of receiving such
support is questionable as long as there is no clear way to measure the positive environmental
impact. Claiming the right to government support will probably not help the cooperative to break
even; making their product in the more standard and recognisable pellet form that seems to be a
better accepted compost product in Kenya, would be a much faster way to achieve success.
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Chapter 5
Biogas from urban organic waste:
a case study about the technical
and economic potential of the ARTI
technology, Nairobi, Kenya
Valery Alumasa, Carbon Africa
Bijal Shah, GreenTech International
Matthew Woods, Carbon Africa
5.1 Context
Given the large quantities of organic waste generated in Nairobi, the LEI composting project has
sought all kinds of opportunities in segregating and using the organic waste stream as a
renewable resource for compost/fertiliser and/or energy generation.
At present there are approximately a dozen biogas companies and NGOs in Kenya. Of these, only
a small number are operating successfully on a commercial basis. Most of the biogas initiatives
receive technical support or subsidies from donors and have not yet succeeded in expanding the
biogas market sufficiently.
While a combination of fixed-dome, floating-drum and plastic tubular technologies are being
promoted, the large majority of these target domestic and institutional users in rural areas.
Livestock dung is the primary feedstock, though examples using other agricultural residues and
human manure do exist. Approximately 2,000 biogas units of all types have been installed in
Kenya since 200715. The Africa Biogas Partnership Programme – which is implemented by SNV,
Hivos and local partners, and funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS) –
promotes biogas digesters throughout Africa. In the 2009/2010 period, the programme built
840 digesters in rural areas in Kenya. Plans for 2011 are to build 2200 more digesters in Kenya.
In this programme, the end users themselves bear the construction costs of the biodigesters,
partly in cash and partly through credit.
Biogas from urban organic waste in Nairobi; a pilot project
In 2010, Carbon Africa and its partners investigated the technical performance and economic
potential of energy generation from urban organic waste in Nairobi. The investigation took the
form of a pilot project, which consisted of testing the ARTI compact biogas system, a small-scale
anaerobic digestion technology. The Appropriate Rural Technology Institute (ARTI) of India – an
NGO based in Pune, Maharashtra State – developed this system in 2003. The ARTI16 plastic,
floating drum technology was chosen as it is modular, mobile, easy to install, relatively low cost
and can use municipal organic and market green waste as feedstock. It can also be made from
local materials.
5.2 Goals and objectives
The pilot project objectives were to:
1. Evaluate whether compact biogas systems are appropriate as part of an urban waste
management strategy in Nairobi;
2. Provide a preliminary economic assessment of a new business model for the roll-out of biogas
digesters at the household and the institutional level in Kenya.
The implementing partners were two Kenyan
firms (Carbon Africa and GreenTech
International) and one Tanzanian-based
company (Joint Environmental Techniques).
Basic system monitoring began in May 2010.
The results presented here are based on
data up to September 2010.
The pilot project tested the technical
performance of two household size (2.5 m3)
and one institutional size (9.5 m3) urban ARTI
biogas digesters for cooking purposes.
In this case study, some light financial
analysis was done (and is presented here),
but the other ISWM aspects were not
included in the case analysis. We therefore
know little about the institutional,
organisational, cultural, governance,
environmental or health aspects of biogas
in this case.
5.3 Technical and performance aspects of the
urban ARTI biogas digester
Unit locations were selected based on access to sunlight (to maintain digester temperatures),
ease of gas piping installation and proximity to kitchens where cooking would take place. Starter
slurry from an existing biogas system was used to speed up the initial digestion process,
resulting in the systems producing gas within a week.
Biogas digester feeding with diluted organic waste feedstock was done daily by the responsible
persons at each site. Input parameters and system performance were likewise monitored every
day with the use of simple methods and equipment.
Data collected included feedstock type, quantity and structure as well as cooking time and
gasholder height. The results of this monitoring are presented in tabel 5.1:
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Household 1 (Westlands)
2.5 m3
2.5 -4 l/min.
2 -4 kg kitchen waste
Vegetable and fruit
peelings and some lentil/
potato starch
Hand chopped to small
pieces
• May, Aug., Sept.:
60 mins
• June, July:
180 mins/week
Household 2 (Kileleshwa)
2.5 m3
2.5 -4 l/min.
3 -4 kg kitchen waste
Vegetable peelings
and fruit and vegetable
residues
Blended into fine porridge
consistency
• May, Aug., Sept.:
90 mins
• June, July:
180 mins/week
Institutional (Westlands)
9.5 m3
18 l/min.
60 l potato starch & varying
other food waste
Potato starch, vegetable
peelings & cooked food
residues from events
Liquid state, diluted with
water
• May: 170 mins
• June: 140 mins
• July: 120 mins
• Aug.: 180 mins
• Sept.: 205 mins
Table 5.1 Set-up and technical performance of the three ARTI biogas digesters
Unit location
Unit size
Gas cooker burn rate
Daily feedstock quantity
Feedstock type
Feedstock structure
Average daily cooking
time from biogas 2010
(June, July = cold season
in Nairobi)
When comparing the two household units, it is noticeable that the Kileleshwa unit produced
slightly more gas even though both receive a similar amount of sunlight. This is likely to be due to
the slightly larger quantities and finer structure of the feedstock.
With regard to the effect of temperature on
gas generation, it is clear that the colder
temperatures in Nairobi, especially during
June and July, significantly affected biogas
production (see Figure 5.1). This was
especially the case for the household size
units, when gas use was reduced to twice a
week.
This performance reduction due to low
temperatures is a serious issue that may
require solutions such as insulation of the
units or a focus on warmer cities (such as
Kisumu and Mombasa in Kenya).
The larger institutional unit was less
vulnerable to the drop in temperatures, but its
performance was still curtailed, as can be
seen in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Average daily cooking time with the institutional size digester
5.4 Economic and financial aspects of the ARTI system
and the ‘gas-for-cash’ business model
The cost for the pilot systems in Nairobi came to EUR 1,015 for the household size unit and
EUR 2,237 for the institutional size unit (see table 5.2).
For the ARTI pilot systems in Nairobi, labour was the most significant cost item due in part for the
requirement for the technicians to come from Tanzania. It is expected that these costs could be
reduced significantly once local trained technicians are available.
Table 5.2 Costs of ARTI digesters compared with costs of fixed-dome digesters
Household ARTI digester Institutional ARTI digester
(2.5 m3) EUR (9.5 m3) EUR
Parts 110 183
Stove 54 99
Foundation 73 141
Tanks 171 600
Labour 607 1214
Total 1015 2237
We can compare the total costs of the ARTI digesters with figures from 2007 and 2009 Kenyan
studies17, which focused more on the fixed dome technology in rural areas. The figures in these
studies range between 435 Euro for a 8m3 digester and 1372 Euro for a 16m3 digester. The
numbers may however not be directly comparable as it is not clear to what extent the studies
include donor subsidies, transport, piping and appliance costs.
Box 1. The gas-for-cash business model
One of the biggest barriers to the uptake of biogas digesters – even with subsidies, sponsors and
micro-finance loans – is usually the capital investment costs. One potential way to break this barrier is
for a private entity, NGO or consortium to develop an energy service delivery (or ‘gas-for-cash’
business model) wherein the entity pays for and maintains ownership of the biogas units once
installed and the client (household, institution) pays only for the gas delivered. A lease-to-
own/instalment payment structure could also be considered, with a small (token) advance deposit by
the client. If the monthly cost of the biogas delivered is significantly less than the cost of LPG,
fuelwood or charcoal, and if the digesters perform reliably, it is anticipated that such a model would
be attractive to a certain market segment. It is also important to note that under this model the
operational risk for the digester remains with the entity and not the customer.
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Average annual cooking fuel expenditure
In mid 2010, focus group discussions with biogas and non-biogas users were held with 96
individuals in the peri-urban areas of Nairobi and semi-rural areas of northern Mt. Kenya to help
gauge the willingness to participate in the gas-for-cash concept. Similarly, a number of existing
local biogas companies were interviewed to assess their interest in such a model. While the
results are not necessarily representative, the findings are summarised in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Average annual cooking fuel expenditure
Peri-urban Nairobi Semi-rural Mt. Kenya
(in euros) (in euros)
Annual average expenditure on cooking fuel 215 137
(charcoal, wood, LPG) (range of 36 to 780) (range of 0 to 600)
Annual average cooking fuel expenditure of existing 580 580
biogas users prior to their adoption of biogas (range of 360 to 800) (range of 40 to 600)
(gives an indication of the cost level at which users
adopt biogas)
Annual average income >4,300 <1,715
(existing biogas users) (non-biogas users)
Cost savings by using the ARTI biogas system
The figures on average annual cooking fuel expenditure (Table 5.3) coincide well with those of a
separate 2009 study in Kenya18. The data is useful for a basic understanding of domestic
willingness-to-pay for biogas and to help anticipate the market potential of biogas energy from
organic waste in urban and semi-urban areas of Kenya’s large cities. In the particular case of the
Westlands institution that hosted the 9.5 m3 ARTI biogas digester during the pilot, namely the
Jai Jalaram Satsang Mandal Temple, monthly LPG costs for cooking far exceed 1,000 euros
(see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Monthly LPG costs and LPG savings of the institution testing the ARTI biogas digester
Month Year LPG LPG cost (average Number of LPG savings (L)
consumption (l) of 0.70 euros /l) functions held with biogas
May 2009 1924 1347 5 -- 755
2010 2679 1875 8
June 2009 2249 1574 10 117
2010 2132 1492 10
July 2009 2314 1620 12 403
2010 1911 1338 9
August 2009 2288 1602 10 -- 292
2010 2580 1756 13
As can be seen in Table 5.4, only the month of June can be used for tentative direct comparison
as the same number of functions (which affect food waste levels) were held in this month in both
2009 and 2010. This is the only month we can compare, although data from the other three
months show that the amount of LPG consumed per function is not necessarily uniform. Based on
this, in June the biogas digester achieved a cost savings of approximately 80 euros (117 litres
saved times 0.70 euros/l).
Given certain assumptions, a simple payback period calculation reveals the following:
Table 5.5 Payback period for the household and institutional ARTI units
ARTI system initial capital cost
Annual cooking fuel expenses
Monthly cooking fuel expenses
Monthly savings with ARTI biogas
Payback period
The above estimates are considered fairly conservative as (a) as mentioned, labour costs may be
reduced and (b) carbon credits have not been included. However, maintenance and replacement
parts cost considerations were also excluded.
Under a gas-for-cash business model, the simple payback period is the amount of time required
before the entity owning the units would begin to make a profit. Based on the conservative
payback scenario above, it is clear that a company would face a substantial risk investing in such
at the household or rural school level. An investment at the urban institutional level may, on the
other hand, already make economic sense.
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Urban household
2.5 m3 ARTI unit
1,015 euros
580 euros (based on
mid-range of peri-urban
users who have already
adopted biogas)
48 euros
16 euros (assuming one
biogas unit replaces
33% of cooking energy
needs)
5.3 years
Urban household
2.5 m3 ARTI unit
1,015 euros
580 euros (based on
mid-range of peri-urban
users who have already
adopted biogas)
48 euros
16 euros (assuming one
biogas unit replaces
33% of cooking energy
needs)
5.3 years
Rural school
9.5 m3 ARTI unit
2,237 euros
750 euros (using
mid-range of RETAP
findings)
62 euros
20 euros (assuming one
biogas unit replaces
33% of cooking energy
needs)
9.3 years
Suitability of gas-for-cash idea
According to the focus group discussions,
gas-for-cash is a welcome idea and most
participants indicated their willingness to
participate in such a scheme.
Key feedback received was:
1. The proposed monthly payments for gas
were perceived as a type of ‘credit’,
although more flexible and less
threatening than that of a loan from a
bank.
2. A key condition for participants’ interest
in the gas-for-cash idea is
that ownership of the biogas system
should be handed over after a period of
time, which should be agreed between
the biogas service company and the user
(lease-to-own model).
3. Participants were willing to feed the units but expected that there would be a reduction
in gas charges due to the fact that they were also contributing to the biogas production.
However, a summary of interviews with existing biogas companies in Kenya reveals a lack of
interest in taking up the gas-for-cash business model. This is due to the bigger risk assumed by
the company, the need for initial capital that is unavailable to many companies, and an inability
to properly plan and execute such a concept.
Thus the preliminary conclusion is that while potential biogas users would welcome the
gas-for-cash business model, existing biogas companies in Kenya are either unable or unwilling
to take up the challenge.
The technical advantages and disadvantages of the ARTI compact biogas system are as follows:
Table 5.6 Advantages and Disadvantages of biogas from organic waste using the ARTI system
Advantages
System fabrication and maintenance is relatively easy
(materials are locally available; it is a simple design,
without mechanical parts)
The system is mobile, modular and does not take
up much space
The digesters are structurally sound (no slurry leaks
and issues such as inlet pipe blockage and water
condensation can be quickly solved)
Longevity of the polyethylene tanks is expected to be
more than 20 years
Odour not perceived as an issue by the households or
the institution that tested the units.
One interesting missing piece in this investigation is what is done with the slurry, and whether
composting or value chain use of the slurry improves the economic and technical performance
of the biogas system.
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Disadvantages
The above-ground system is sensitive to fluctuations in
temperature and performs poorly in cold weather
The waste feedstock may not always be available in
sufficient quantities to produce the desired level of gas
and in some cases requires some processing (chopping,
dilution) to help speed up gas production
There may be aesthetic issues with the adoption of this
technology in urban areas
A trained technician is required for serious maintenance
and repair issues
Release of gas from the space between the digester and
the telescoping gas holder may reduce system efficiency
If located too close to a kitchen, the flies that are
attracted by the system may turn off users
5.5 Key findings of the ARTI biogas pilot project
1. Technical performance: is satisfactory. The ARTI compact biogas test units installed in Nairobi
operated as designed. Cooking gas was produced from urban organic waste with no major
system problems.
2. Air temperature significantly affects ARTI system performance: during the cold season
(June, July) in Nairobi, the colder weather seriously curtailed biogas production in the above-
ground, uninsulated ARTI digesters, which operate two hours per day versus three to four
hours per day for the institutional unit.
3. Institutional size units are more economical than household units: institutional size units
appear to offer a shorter payback period of two to four years versus five to nine years.
This suggests that they are more immediately commercially viable, especially where LPG
cooking fuel is replaced.
4. Consumers are positive about the gas-for-cash biogas business idea: the initial indications are
that existing and potential biogas users in peri-urban and semi-rural areas of Kenya would be
willing to participate in the gas-for-cash concept.
5. Providers have a lower level of interest and confidence than consumers. That is, the gas-for-
cash idea is perceived as too risky (and/or perhaps too commercially threatening) for existing
biogas companies. The required capital investment costs and business risks may be too high
to entice a company to implement the gas-for-cash idea.
6. For gas-for-cash to be viable, therefore, there is a need for a third party to reduce the risk.
This third party could be a local authority that pays a diversion credit for diverting urban
waste, or it could be a buyer of carbon credits. Without such a third party, the business
aspect seems questionable.
5.6 Conclusions
This case is the only one of the four in which there is no involvement of the local authority at all;
in part, this is because it is not only a rural but also an urban business model. It is similar to the
Lilongwe case in that the beneficiaries are individual households or institutions, and to ECoH in
that there is a kind of presumption that there will be some kind of private company that will
organise the financial side of the gas-for-cash model. This assumption cannot be verified yet,
in the face of the fact that the potential users are much more confident and interested in the
model than potential umbrella providers.
Not much can be said about the sociocultural, environmental, institutional or governance aspects,
as these were neither prominently featured in the project nor reported upon in the case study.
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Chapter 6
Reflections and conclusions
Anne Scheinberg, WASTE
Yuca Waarts, LEI, part of Wageningen UR
Project point of departure
The Nairobi urban organic waste project differs in its approach from many other development
cooperation projects, and these differences are worth highlighting. The set-up of the project and
its main way of proceeding are based neither on the idea of managing urban waste nor on the
idea of providing nutrients to the agricultural value chain. Rather, the core idea of the project
relates to connecting urban waste streams with peri-urban and rural agricultural value chains.
The four case studies include one (the urban biogas pilot) that was partly financed by the project.
The ECoH Holdings composting company finances its own operations as a business. In both
cases the economic beneficiaries of the activity are individual natural or legal persons: a company
in the case of ECoH, and the household or institutional hosts for the digesters in the case of
biogas. There are also individual benefits associated with sourcing in the case of ECoH: some of
the suppliers are paid.
Two additional case studies report on initiatives financed and organised primarily as livelihood or revenue
enhancement projects. In both cases there are economic benefits to groups, and the organisation
of the economic relationship and the sharing of benefits has been facilitated by a third party NGO.
Thus at the core of our project is the idea that while the environmental benefits of closing nutrient
cycles are important, they will not drive sustainable economic activity. The essence of
sustainability in this case is that the private-to-private transactions work and provide sufficient
benefits for all parties. The role of government in such a private-to-private system is relegated to
some variety of 'getting out of the way'.
Successful models for connecting urban organic wastes
with the agricultural value chain
In some way, all of the four case studies represent some level of success. A reason for this is
that we wanted to study initiatives that appear to be operational. However, the fact that we found
operational initiatives is in itself quite remarkable, as the track record for organic waste
processing and valorisation in sub-Saharan Africa is not robust. So it is worthwhile to look at the
ingredients that the projects share, as a way of understanding how these small projects have
achieved what so many larger, better-funded initiatives have failed to achieve.
Some specific conclusions are listed below, with the caveat that the number of cases is small and
the level of analysis is limited.
 Individual benefits enhance the potential of composting initiatives in the African context
Specific individual benefits work better in the African context than collective benefits or
positive environmental externalities. The more individual the benefits in this rather limited
sample, the more robust the interest of the individual stakeholders in making the initiative
work.
 A positive enabling environment for initiatives can be created by the local authorities
In terms of governance, the relationship with the local authority appears best when it is asked
for, and gives, passive positive attention to the project. Specifically in Lilongwe, the general
understanding of the positive impacts of composting is enough to secure goodwill and a
positive enabling environment. Since the initiative does not need more than that, it works.
 Active involvement of local authorities is not realistic as long as disposal is not priced
The active and especially financial involvement of the CCN is not realistic as long as disposal
is not priced. Reaching beyond the cases for additional information, we can take the
conclusion in the above paragraph a step further: the lack of active support in Nakuru and
Nairobi is to be expected, primarily because these municipalities still do not have priced
disposal, and therefore do not derive any economic benefit from the positive environmental
externalities (they remain externalities). In this context, it is not realistic to expect financial
support from the CCN, and both ECoH and NAWACOM would be better advised to focus more
on improving their own operations.
 Entrepreneurs can build sustainable organic waste recycling business models
Where government cannot be expected to become directly involved, there is a need for
entrepreneurs to take an active role in business models that build on valorising organic
wastes. Financially sustainable valorisation of organic waste seems to have potential,
as the cases in this publication show.
 Financial institutions should take an active role in waste recycling business models
Access to finance is of paramount importance when waste recycling initiatives want to
upscale their activities. It would solve ECoH’s need to expand and NAWACOM’s need to invest.
However, for NAWACOM, the ability to repay a loan – and its bankability as a commercial
cooperative – will most likely require not only access to finance, but also a more marketable
product and a more professional marketing strategy. The involvement of financial institutions
could also create a possibility to build the gas-for-cash business model without the necessary
involvement of a risk-averse private investor. Gas-for-cash could, in fact, be organised on the
same principle as the Lilongwe Women’s Composting CBO: creation of a cooperative of gas
hosts, with an NGO or a bank anchoring the collectivity and the public utility managing the billing.
Is there a potential for closing nutrient cycles using
slurry from biogas digesters?
After we finalised these case studies, we thought of a specific issue that we should like to
investigate in the future: can using slurry from biogas digesters, fed with green organic waste,
contribute to closing nutrient cycles between the city and peri-urban areas in a financially
sustainable way? This is certainly worth investigating, as a considerable increase in the use of
biogas digesters in urban areas will lead to a substantial increase in the quantity of slurry
produced, which will become either a nuisance or a valuable asset that can be used or possibly
even sold.
In conclusion, these case studies suggest that valorising organic waste in Africa might have more
potential than expected, as long as the elements of private sector activity and individual benefits
remain central.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Case study template
Title: Biowaste Management Case Study
Template
Author: WASTE, Anne Scheinberg and
Nathalie Agathos (nagathos@waste.nl)
Version: Case template version
Recipients: Readers and stakeholders in organic
waste in Africa
1 Introduction
The purpose of this document is to guide the consistent, useful, and interesting write-up of
experiences with composting in Africa. We are seeking to create a document that provides
genuine insight into organic waste management, specifically composting and biogas production.
The goal is to produce a small publication that gives readers both qualitative and quantitative
information on feasible ways to connect urban organic waste streams with the agricultural supply
chain.
We are preparing these case studies for readers in three quite different categories:
1. Development professionals, NGOs, city twinnings and city officials who want to understand
the potential role of valorising organic waste in their cities.
2. Micro, small and medium-scale entrepreneurs who and community-based enterprises that
want to produce compost and create livelihoods, or use it to create agricultural and
horticultural products such as blended topsoil, tomatoes or energy.
3. Local experts in waste management or sustainable agriculture who advise the first two groups.
We expect that there will be two kinds of case write-ups, namely full case studies or case
examples, depending on whether the biowaste recovery is going on at the present time and can
be visited, or whether it occurred some years ago and can only be reported on second hand.
There may also be quite different levels of monitoring and information. We refer to them both as
‘cases’.
The write-up will also generally be clear as to whether the case focuses on:
• a project, which has a beginning, a middle and an end, a budget, an implementing agency, etc.;
• a programme, which runs for longer and has larger ambitions, more actors, multiple purposes
and, potentially, multiple sites, or
• an ongoing operation, in the sense that it is part of the normal daily work of a municipal
department or an agricultural enterprises, but may not be well-monitored or documented.
The idea is to have good qualitative, quantitative and analytic information in each case, also for
the group as a whole, so that we synthesise the experience and produce genuine insights.
This document provides a basic structure for the writing up of case studies, demonstrating
experiences in organic waste recovery, treatment and selling. The guiding framework for the
development of the case studies is the ISWM framework, which consists of a stakeholders
analysis, a waste system's elements analysis (generation, collection, transfer, treatment, etc.)
and an analysis of a waste system's aspects (social, technical, environmental, legal, etc.).
We use the ISWM approach as it is presented in the Habitat book Solid Waste Management in the
World’s Cities so as to position the case as to the policy drivers that are active in solid waste
management in the host community of the case. This is because it matters whether the city is
busy organising the collection of waste in response to the public health driver, or is working on
controlling disposal in service to recently enacted drivers for environmental protection, or that the
operational drive is to minimise disposal and conserve resources.
2 Structure of the case example and case study
3 Short case description at the beginning (1-2 pages)
(also serves as the shorter ‘case example’)
a) The context or ‘shell’ that provides the enabling environment for the case:
the host city, its solid waste system, the climate
b) Which drivers, whose problem biowaste is, why was something done in the first place
c) The story or description, with photos
d) Some very basic figures
e) The result (did it work or not?)
f) The insights, the good, the bad, the ugly and the special (see below)
4 Detailed case information based on the ISWM framework
4.1 Stakeholders and their roles. Describe those involved and what roles they have,
such as:
a) Project initiator
b) Donor or national ministry that finances
c) Private entrepreneurs
d) Investors
e) Operators
f) Beneficiaries in terms of livelihoods
g) Beneficiaries in terms of organic waste generators
h) Beneficiaries/clients in terms of users of compost or biogas
i) Waste generators/sources
j) Users/buyers/brokers
k) Value chain and where the case fits
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4.2 The system elements: description of the physical elements in the system as
they are in relation to the case (and if possible, how the project or programme
changed them). Begin with the process flow of the organic material:
a) Prepare a process flow/materials balance in Excel, or sketched and then transferred to Excel
b) Where is it generated?
c) How is collected?
d) Where is it transferred to?
e) How is it processed?
f) How much goes in and how much comes out, and what is lost? How much residue and
where does it go?
g) Which process is used (windrow, static pile, in-vessel, biogas reactor)?
h) What materials and additives are used?
i) What are the steps, and the residence time?
j) Where is it sold or used?
k) What are the responding markets?
l) What are the specifications?
4.3 The sustainability aspects
Physical/technical, and performance:
a) How many tonnes/day are generated, and what percentage is used in the operation?
b) How does it affect the solid waste system?
c) How does it affect the urban/peri-urban/rural agricultural value chain?
d) What changes has it brought about, what would have happened to organic waste without
recovery?
e) What is it used for? What product or energy source does it replace?
f) Performance characteristics and operations
g) Is it operating now and did the researcher see it in operation?
h) How many days did it operate in the last half year, in the last month?
i) How much material was sold last year? Last month? How much material is there now in
stock?
j) Is it still going on?
k) What are the plans?
Economic & financial:
a) What is the cost of disposal in the host community and who pays the cost of disposal?
If possible, divided by collection cost, disposal cost and prices for services to households
and businesses
b) Is it a final or intermediate product?
c) Pro-forma financial analysis: what do the financials look like?
d) Is it profitable now, or when is it projected to be?
e) Sources of funds – grants, subsidies, investors, private equity or loans? From where?
f) Revenues? Do they cover the costs? How are the prices set?
g) Prices charged and per what units – same prices to all users, or differentiated?
h) Who pays whom for what? How does the money flow?
i) Are there funds transfers from the solid waste system, based on avoided costs?
j) Does the municipality sponsor it in any other way, for example, by providing land or
equipment, or using the compost?
Sociocultural:
a) Is compost a product? Is it known, valued?
b) Are there taboos or restrictions, for example, on handling or using waste in an Islamic
society, whether organic waste is women’s or men’s work, whether human excreta
can be used?
c) Who can and who can’t handle women's/men's waste?
d) Lack of knowledge about the product.
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Environmental & health:
a) What regulatory issues are there for compost/biogas production?
b) For application or use?
c) Is compost regulated under the same standards as fertiliser?
d) Is there lab testing and what are the results
e) Is NPK regulated?
Organisational and institutional:
a) Who owns the organic material? What claims were/are there that compete with the case
operations?
b) Who owns the facility/compost.
c) What kind of agreements/contracts?
d) How is the municipality involved? Do operators have to have permits?
Do they have them?
Governance, policy, legal:
a) What is the legal framework?
b) Is the city council or other political organ involved explicitly?
Is the construction a PPP? Is there a host community agreement?
c) Is the project on public or private land? Is the agreement long term or short term?
d) Is it formal or informal; that is, does the solid waste system ‘know’ about and/or recognise it?
e) Do operators need to be registered? Have permits? Pay taxes?
f) Are the operators registered? Do they pay fees and taxes?
g) Is the legal framework supportive/lacking?
h) What are the legal implications/restrictions regarding transport of waste, labelling of
products, treatment facilities, etc.?
5 The good, the bad, the ugly, and the special
1. What stands out about this case? What is replicable? Why does the operator think it
succeeded or failed? Do you as researcher agree with the operator?
2. What kinds of linkages and relationships has the project or programme created between the
urban waste system and the agricultural value chain? What can be learned from those
linkages or relationships?
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Appendix 2: Visit to Kayole Environmental (19 March 2009)
Anne Scheinberg, WASTE
A visit was made to the plastics recycling operation of Mr S.N. Munywe, who represents a private
MSE called Kema Re-using LD Plastics and a CBO called Kayole Environmental. The field visit was
in the south-east of Nairobi, and included the area called Kayole and a compost site in the area of
Ruai, where the new landfill will be located.
Kema Re-using LD Plastics
We went first to a private house in the Kayole area, where the remnants of a plastics processing
operation were shown to us, including photographs and a hand press, and sample roofing tiles.
The tiles were about 40 cm square, about 2 cm thick, and not completely uniform in thickness,
with a mixed colour showing the original plastics used. The process used was to heat plastics,
probably mostly LDPE, in a cast iron cauldron of a sort usually used for household cooking. The
melted plastic was cast into a mould to make roofing tiles, apparently one at a time. According to
Mr Munywe, more than 10,000 tiles were made, and about 3,000 were sold. The price per tile
was not mentioned. In answer to the question whether the tiles melted in use, he stated that they
were not vulnerable to melting. He did not state whether there were additives or what the recipe
was, nor where the remaining 7,000 tiles are stored. However, it was clear that this operation is
no longer active, and that there is a desire to start it up again on a different site, with external
capital.
Kayole Environmental
Kayole Environmental is portrayed as a classic East African CBO that began in 2000 to collect
waste from households in its area of Kayole. The cost for the service was 40 Ksh per household
per month in 2000, and in 2008, when operations stopped, it had risen to 120 Ksh. At the peak,
it served 12,000 households with a system of washable waste bags. The collection was three
times per week per household, and collected about 7 kg per household per week. Each handcart
had a route of about 500 households. The handcart operator provided a clean, washed bag in
return for a bag of waste in the reusable washable bag. According to Mr Munywe, the group
consisted of about 100 persons, of whom 80 were active in the collection, organised in cells,
and the rest in the administration.
The group used an unclaimed site for transfer and composting. They separated non-organic
waste and composted the organic waste, using the Tithonia plant, which is known for its high N
and P content, as an enricher, and produced about 1,000 tonnes. The compost was sold for
about 3 Ksh per kg. Tests had shown that it has an NPK content of 6-4-4 (a statement that the
experts in the team seriously doubted).
The operation ended in 2007 when the new rules of NEMA required CBOs to be licensed and their
site was repossessed. It was unclear why Kayole did not successfully register, but Mr Munywe
implied that there was political influence to give the concession to a private company. It was
reported that they had sold some compost, but that they lost about 200 tonnes of finished
compost when the site was repossessed.
The CBO would like to resume operations but has not attempted to re-register. Mr Munywe
reported plans for recovery of compost from markets, on the model of the women’s group at the
City Park market opposite the Aga Khan market. He showed us a plot of ¾ acre in a new area
where some women were waiting for us in a shed, and asked for 14,000 euros investment funds
to start composting at that site. He provided a pro-forma budget for composting.
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LEI, part of Wageningen UR
LEI, the agricultural economics research institute
which is part of University & Research centre,
develops economic expertise for government bodies
and industry in the field of food, agriculture and the
natural environment. By means of independent
research, LEI offers its customers a solid basis for
socially and strategically justifiable policy choices.
Alterra, part of Wageningen UR
Alterra is the research institute for our green living
environment. Alterra is part of Wageningen
University & Research centre and offers a
combination of practical and scientific research in
a multitude of disciplines related to the green world
around us and the sustainable use of our living
environment: knowledge of water, nature,
biodiversity, climate, landscape, forest, ecology,
environment, soil, landscape and spatial planning,
geo-information, remote sensing, flora and fauna,
urban green, man and society, etc.
WASTE advisers on urban environment and
development works towards sustainable
improvement of the urban poor's living conditions
and the urban environment in general. Their multi-
year, multi-country programmes and projects have
a focus on bottom-up development in relation to
recycling, solid waste management, ecological
sanitation and knowledge sharing. WASTE, located
in the Netherlands, teams up with organisations in
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe that
share its goals and approaches.
LEI, part of Wageningen UR
PO Box 29703
2502 LS The Hague, The Netherlands
tel.: 31 (0)70 3358330
fax: 31 (0)70 3615624
www.lei.wur.nl/uk
Yuca Waarts (project manager)
tel.: +31 (0)70 3358384
yuca.waarts@wur.nl
Alterra, part of Wageningen UR
PO Box 47
6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands
tel.: +31 (0)317 48 07 00
fax: +31 (0)317 4190 00
www.alterra.wur.nl/uk
Project contact: Kor Zwart
tel.: +31 (0)317 486480
kor.zwart@wur.nl
WASTE advisers on urban environment and
development
Nieuwehaven 201
2801 CW Gouda, The Netherlands
tel. +31 (0)182 522625
fax +31 (0)182 550313
www.waste.nl
Project contact: Nathalie Agathos
tel.: +31 (0)182 522625
nagathos@waste.nl
Senior recycling & waste management
adviser: Anne Scheinberg
tel.: +31 (0)6 2876 3255
ascheinberg@waste.nl
Appendix 3: The Nairobi organic urban waste project
partnership (2009-2010)
The Nairobi organic waste recycling project (2009-2010) was implemented by a partnership of
Dutch and Kenyan organisations. The following provides information about these organisations,
as well as the contact details of the staff involved in the project.
WASTE advisers on urban environment
and development
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The ECM Centre is a specialist consultancy firm
providing solutions in quality, environmental and
strategic management, and organisational
development. The Centre offers a unique range of
products and services leading to cost reduction,
higher quality and improved environmental
performance in industry. Its clients include
companies from the manufacturing and service
sectors and development agencies.
Carbon Africa
Carbon Africa is a fully-fledged carbon company
providing the essential services to take potential
carbon projects from the initial design stages up
to the final point of selling the carbon credits. In
addition, the company can support the development
of the underlying business through feasibility
studies, business planning, financial modelling and
arranging equity and debt finance. Carbon Africa
is part of a global network of next-generation
environmental entrepreneurs and investors that
assists clients and partners to realise profitable and
socially responsible green business opportunities.
ETC East Africa
For ETC, modern international development
cooperation means working in innovative ways on
our themes in both the South and North. ETC East
Africa is part of the ETC International Group. It is
a not-for-profit but market-oriented, businesslike
private sector organisation that mainly deals with
development programmes for the public
and civil society sectors. It encourages
and supports local initiatives that enhance
empowerment and sustainable development and put
people’s own culture and resources, local
knowledge and experience, and full and genuine
participation in development programmes so that
they can take responsibility for their own future.
The main intervention domains of ETC East Africa
are research, extension & development; agriculture
and natural resources management; drought
management and food security; public health,
water and sanitation; training and institutional
development; and support for local government
reforms and decentralisation.
ECM Centre Limited
K.P. Flats, No. 7, Milimani Road
PO Box 10135-00100
Nairobi, Kenya
tel.: +254 (0) 2712999 or +254 (0) 3001661
mobile: +254 (0)720 828621 / 734 947882
fax: +254 (0) 2712999
www.ecmcentre.com
Project contact: Joyce Wanjiru Gachugi
tel.: +254 (0)725 883253
joyce.gachugi@ecmcentre.com
Carbon Africa Limited
PO Box 14938-00800
Westlands
Nairobi, Kenya
tel.: +254 (0)726 385657 or
+254 (0)721 620803
www.carbonafrica.co.ke
Project contact: Matthew Woods
tel.: +254 (0)20 2335771
matt@carbonafrica.co.ke
ETC East Africa
ABC Place, First Floor, Wing 1, Waiyaki Way
PO Box 76378
00508 Yaya
Nairobi, Kenya
tel.: +254 (0)20 44 45 421/2/3
fax: + 254 (0)20 44 45 424
www.etc-international.org
Project contact: Davies Onduru
tel.: +254 (0)733 760655
d.onduru@etc-eastafrica.org
Environmental Cost Management
Centre (ECMC)
Project information on the Wageningen UR library website
For more information on this project, contact one of the contact persons (see above) or find
documentation in the Wageningen UR library:
To do so, go to: http://library.wur.nl/ and enter the Library Catalog (http://library.wur.nl/desktop/catalog/).
Then search for publications, by using the last names of the contact persons, or by searching
with the terms 'Nairobi' and 'waste' or 'organic'.
Alternatively, search the Wageningen UR library for the titles of the following publications:
• Converting City Waste into compost pilot Nairobi (LNV-BO-10-006-115): report inception
mission March 16 - 21, 2009
• Converting city waste into compost: pilot Nairobi (LNV-BO-10-006-115): report phase one:
inventory and assessment (2009)
• Converting city waste into compost pilot Nairobi (LNV-BO-10-006-115): inventory and analysis
of users, producers and markets for compost, biogas and livestock feeds in urban and peri-
urban areas of Nairobi (2009)
• Nairobi organic city waste recycling project information (2010)
• Challenges in reusing non-domestic organic waste in Nairobi (2010)
• Final report on household and institutional biogas from urban organic waste in Nairobi.
Technical performance & economic potential (2010).
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This publication is the result of Project BO-10-011-104,
‘Converting City Waste into Compost’ (Great Lakes
Nations: pilot Nairobi). This action research project
was funded in 2009 and 2010 by the Netherlands
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and
Innovation.
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Waste management is a growing challenge in Africa. The increase in solid waste generation has
not been accompanied by an equivalent increase in waste management activities by urban
authorities or private entrepreneurs. In a dry continent where soils are seriously depleted and
countries like Kenya are facing serious fertiliser shortages, the recovery and valorisation of
organic urban waste in agricultural systems is astonishingly underutilised.
This publication presents four examples of recent attempts to manage organic urban waste
sustainably in the African context. Three case studies focus on compost production, one case
study on the potential of a relatively new technique to convert urban organic waste into biogas.
We hope these case studies will give you genuine insights into the feasibility of a variety of ways
to successfully and sustainably valorise urban organic waste streams.
